Threat Vetting

Sources and how the checks work

The official guidance behind threatvetting.com, last reviewed 26 October 2026, and exactly what the link and header checks look for, and what they cannot see.

1 min — Due for review by 2026-11-25

Official guidance, reviewed 25 October 2026

Added during the October 2026 update

The real domain, worked out with a simplified copy of the Public Suffix List (snapshot of 28 December 2025: country endings such as .co.uk and about thirty shared-hosting endings such as github.io, netlify.app and pages.dev), with a warning when the link sits on a hosting service anyone can use; an “@” before the address; a bare IP address; encoded foreign characters (xn--); link shorteners; http instead of https; endings that look like files (.zip, .mov); very long chains of subdomains; well-known brand names, or look-alike spellings of them, outside their own domain; an email address inside the link.

What the header check reads

The SPF, DKIM and DMARC results from the Authentication-Results lines, and whether Reply-To, Return-Path or the display name point to another domain.

What none of this sees

The content of the page behind a link, whether a domain is brand new, or whether a real account was hacked. That is why every result ends with: check through a channel you already know.